Avoiding Federal and State Constitutional Limitations in Taxation by Ordower, Henry
Saint Louis University School of Law 
Scholarship Commons 
All Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
Avoiding Federal and State Constitutional Limitations in Taxation 
Henry Ordower 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty 



































Julio Homem de Siqueira, et al., eds. Princípios Constitucionais Tributários (Tax 
Principles and Constitutional Law) Belo Horizonte, Brazil, Forthcoming 
 
168 Tax Notes Federal 1447 (August 24, 2020) and 97 Tax Notes State 803 
(August 24, 2020) 
taxnotes federal
Volume 168, Number 8  ■ August 24, 2020
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
Avoiding Federal and State 
Constitutional Limitations in Taxation
by Henry Ordower
Reprinted from Tax Notes Federal, August 24, 2020, p. 1447
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648673
TAX NOTES FEDERAL, AUGUST 24, 2020 1447
tax notes federal
VIEWPOINT
Avoiding Federal and State Constitutional 
Limitations in Taxation
by Henry Ordower
The U.S. Constitution reserves all powers to 
the states or the people unless that power is 
delegated expressly to the United States or 
prohibited expressly to the states.1 The 
Constitution delegates the power to impose taxes 
to Congress: “The Congress shall have power to 
lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; 
but all duties, imposts and excises shall be 
uniform throughout the United States.”2 In 
addition to uniformity, the Constitution requires 
that “direct taxes . . . be apportioned among the 
several states which may be included within this 
union, according to their respective numbers,”3 
and that “no capitation, or other direct, tax shall be 
laid, unless in proportion to the census or 
enumeration.”4
The 16th Amendment, which was adopted in 
1913,5 permitted an income tax without 
apportionment among the states. The amendment 
was necessary for the enactment of a federal 
income tax because the Supreme Court in Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company6 invalidated an 
1894 income tax as a direct tax on capital requiring 
apportionment.7
While the Constitution prohibits federal 
duties on exports but not imports,8 it gives 
Congress exclusive jurisdiction over duties by 
prohibiting states from imposing import or export 
duties unless Congress consents.9 In other areas, 
the Constitution does not limit the states’ power to 
impose other taxes despite taxing power having 
been delegated to the United States.
All 50 states have their own constitutions 
confirming the state and local power to tax, but 
taxpayer initiatives in some states have added 
express constitutional limitations on taxation,10 for 
example, the Hancock Amendment in Missouri11 
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In this article, 
Ordower examines 
instances in which the 
Supreme Court 
reviewed state tax laws 
for conflict with the 
Constitution and 
overruled its earlier 
decisions in similar 
cases. He also looks at a 
single long-standing Supreme Court precedent 
limiting federal income taxation under the 
Constitution and at avoidance of state 
constitutional taxing limitations.
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1
U.S. Const. Amend. X (1789): “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
2
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 8, cl. 1.
3
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 2, cl. 3.
4
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 9, cl. 4.
5
U.S. Const. Amend. XVI (1913).
6
157 U.S. 429 (1895), affirmed on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
7
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 2, cl. 3.
8
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 9, cl. 5.
9
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 10, cl. 2, 3.
10
Ariel Jurow Kleiman, “Tax Limits and the Future of Local 
Democracy,” 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1884 (2020) (cataloguing and analyzing 
state tax limitations).
11
Mo. Const. Art. X, section 16 et seq.
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and Proposition 13 in California.12 The Hancock 
Amendment restricts the power of the Missouri 
legislature and local jurisdictions to increase 
existing taxes by more than an inflation 
adjustment or to enact any new tax without 
approval of the electorate by ballot referendum.13 
Proposition 13 limited increases in state ad 
valorem property taxes on personal residences (a 
principal source of local revenue supporting 
schools and other government services) until the 
property is sold in an arm’s-length transaction. 
Then the tax could increase to an amount based 
on the transfer price rather than the previous 
owner’s historical cost.
The first part of this article provides 
background of constitutional review of federal 
and state laws and compares review in other 
countries. The second part examines instances in 
which the Supreme Court reviewed state taxing 
laws for conflict with the Constitution and 
overruled its earlier decisions in similar cases. 
One case involving a poll or capitation tax worked 
its way through the courts as the Constitution was 
being amended to prevent the states from using a 
poll tax. Another case, from 2018, resolved a long-
standing tax collection and avoidance problem 
with state sales taxes. The third part focuses on a 
single long-standing Supreme Court precedent 
limiting federal tax law under the Constitution, 
which Congress increasingly has not followed. 
The decision and recent congressional action is 
contextual in the current discussions of other tax 
proposals. The fourth part considers areas in 
which constitutional limitations exist, but 
legislatures and courts seem to have no interest in 
addressing them. The fourth part is the 
conclusion.
Constitutional Review of Taxes
In McCulloch v. Maryland,14 the U.S. Supreme 
Court15 held that a state tax on a national bank 
impermissibly interfered with the federal 
government’s lawful exercise of its powers, 
including powers “necessary and proper” to the 
United States, even though the powers were not 
expressly enumerated in the Constitution.16 
McCulloch accepts the concurrent power of both 
states and the federal government to tax, but its 
limitation of the state’s power to tax federal 
functions and, conversely, the federal 
government’s power to tax states, is based in the 
notion “that the power to tax involves the power 
to destroy.”17 This decision led to development of 
a doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. 
The scope of that doctrine has contracted over the 
years. The federal government may tax interest on 
state and local obligations without running afoul 
of intergovernmental tax immunity or the 10th 
Amendment.18 States may tax salaries and 
pensions of federal employees provided that they 
do not treat those employees more harshly than 
state employees.19
Unlike Germany and other countries that 
have a constitutional court with ultimate 
authority over interpretation of the national 
constitution,20 the U.S. Constitution leaves its 
interpretation and application to the courts of 
general jurisdiction.21 Review of statutes for 
consistency with the Constitution is not 
automatic22 but requires a case or controversy to 
be presented to the courts.23 The case may be an 
12
Cal. Const. Art. XIII A [tax limitation] (added June 6, 1978, by Prop. 
13).
13
Mo. Const. Art. X, section 18(e).
14
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Compare the EU, where the central 
authority lacks the power to tax but the member states impose a 
contribution requirement for EU expenses on each member state. 
European Parliament, Fact Sheets on the European Union, General Tax 
Policy.
15
Supreme Court and Court refer to the U.S. Supreme Court.
16
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 8, cl. 18: “to make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, 
and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of 
the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”
17
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, at 431.
18
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (interest on unregistered 
bonds taxable).
19
Dawson v. Steager, 586 U.S. ___ (2019) (citing McCulloch and its 
progeny, the Court confirmed that a state could tax federal employees on 
their pension payments from the United States but not more severely 
than it taxed state retirees on their state pensions. Discrimination by the 
state against federal employees was impermissible).
20
Art. 100, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic 
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany) requires the courts to refer 
constitutional questions to the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional 
Court).
21
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the 
power of the federal courts to review statutes for conflict with the 
Constitution).
22
Compare France, in which the Conseil Constitutionnel has the 
power to review legislation at enactment upon petition without prior 
litigation. F.L. Morton, “Judicial Review in France: A Comparative 
Analysis,” 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 89 (1988).
23
U.S. Const. Art. III, section 1, cl. 1.
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action for a declaratory judgment in an 
appropriate instance.24 With limited exceptions, 
the Supreme Court has discretion to accept or 
reject review, including review of constitutional 
issues, when litigants petition the Court for a writ 
of certiorari to review a lower court decision.25 The 
courts, including the Supreme Court, generally 
are reticent on constitutional issues, and when 
possible, resolve their cases without interpreting 
the Constitution. The volume of constitutional 
decisions relative to cases resolved on other 
grounds tends to be lower in the United States 
than in countries that have a dedicated 
constitutional court and mandatory referral of 
constitutional questions.26
The Constitution limits the reach of state 
constitutions on matters reserved to the United 
States and, to a lesser degree, matters regarding 
which there is concurrent jurisdiction, like 
taxation.27 If state law, including tax law, conflicts 
with the Constitution, the federal courts may 
strike down the state law, but do so reluctantly. 
Whenever possible federal courts defer to the 
decisions of state legislatures if the state law 
serves a rational, legitimate governmental 
purpose. If, however, a state law 
disproportionally disadvantages a suspect 
classification of individuals — people of color, for 
example — or undermines a taxpayer’s 
fundamental rights like free exercise of religion, a 
federal court is likely to apply a more demanding 
review standard. The court may require the state 
to demonstrate that (1) the state has a compelling 
need for the law, and (2) the state cannot meet that 
need with a law that does not harm the suspect 
group or limit fundamental rights.28 In Harper29 a 
tax imperiled the taxpayer’s fundamental right to 
vote. The state could not demonstrate a 
compelling need for payment of the tax to secure 
the right to vote so the Court intervened and 
struck it down.
Even arguments based on fundamental rights 
are often unsuccessful. For example, in Nordlinger 
v. Hahn30 a taxpayer challenged Proposition 1331 
under the federal equal protection clause.32 Equal 
protection is the United States’ manifestation of 
the concept of equal rights. Equal protection does 
not demand precision in distribution of rights but 
requires only reasonable basis for laws that have 
disparate impacts on individuals or groups. If the 
law affects a suspect class of individuals 
adversely or limits a fundamental right, courts 
may apply heightened scrutiny. With property 
values increasing rapidly in California, a new 
resident is likely to pay a substantially higher 
property tax than a neighbor who has lived in 
their home for a long period, even though the 
homes are substantially identical. The taxpayer in 
Nordlinger argued that Proposition 13 led to 
substantial disparities in ad valorem real estate 
taxes between residences owned by long-term 
owners and new buyers, thereby infringing on her 
fundamental right to travel because the 
substantial increase in property taxes following 
her purchase of a residence impinges on her 
ability to relocate to California.33 The Supreme 
Court rejected the right-to-travel claim because 
the taxpayer was living in a rented apartment in 
California already, and applied the minimal 
rational basis review standard. It held that the 
proposition did not violate equal protection 
24
E.g., the recent decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, 585 U.S. ___, 138 
S. Ct. 2080 (2018), discussed infra in text accompanying note 42 was a 
declaratory judgment action brought by the state of South Dakota.
25
Generally, on certiorari, see U.S. Courts, Supreme Court 
Procedures.
26
Compare Germany, supra note 20. See generally Henry Ordower, 
“Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional Principles: 
Germany and the United States Contrasted,” 7 Fla. Tax Rev. 259 at 261-4 
(2006) (hereinafter Ordower, “Horizontal and Vertical Equity”). For a 
broader collection of U.S. case law addressing the legislative power to 
tax, see Tracy A. Kaye and Stephen W. Mazza, “United States — National 
Report: Constitutional Limitations of the Legislative Power to Tax in the 
United States,” 15 Mich. St. J. of Int’l. L. 481 (2007).
27
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (prohibiting state taxation of a 
federal bank).
28
This article refers to such review as heightened scrutiny.
29
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), discussed 
infra note 37 and accompanying text.
30
505 U.S. 1 (1992).
31
Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
32
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, section 1: “nor shall any State . . . deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
33
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding a one-year waiting 
period to qualify for welfare benefits when moving to a new state 
unduly restricted the individual’s right to travel and establish residence 
in a new location).
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because the tax structure served the rational state 
interest of maintaining neighborhood stability.34
Overruling Precedent
Fundamental Rights: Poll Taxes and Voter 
Suppression
In Breedlove35 the Supreme Court upheld a poll 
(capitation) tax applicable to all adult males but 
only to women who registered to vote. While the 
legislation did not expressly state that its goal was 
to suppress voting by people of color, the effect of 
the tax fell on the state’s impoverished Black 
population and prevented many from exercising 
their voting rights. The Court concluded that even 
though the male taxpayers in Breedlove suffered 
discrimination based on their sex, adult men were 
not a disadvantaged and suspect class of litigants 
entitled to heightened scrutiny, so the state need 
only have a rational basis for the statute to 
withstand challenge under the equal protection 
clause.36 The Court upheld the tax in Breedlove 
because it served the rational state purpose of 
raising revenue.
The Court overruled its Breedlove decision 
with Harper,37 in which it applied the 
Constitution’s equal protection clause to 
invalidate a poll tax. Failure to pay the poll tax 
barred the taxpayer from voting.38 The Court 
concluded that voting — as a fundamental right 
— required heightened scrutiny in its review of 
the state tax, and held that voting rights must not 
depend on the voter’s ability to pay the tax. Even 
acknowledging the equal protection violation, 
Justice Hugo Black dissented, confirming a 
commitment to the principle of stare decisis even in 
the face of historical error by arguing that the 
Court should follow its precedent because the 
Constitution had not changed.39
The victory for voting rights in Harper and the 
24th Amendment proved pyrrhic. While taxes no 
longer played a role in voter suppression, 
gerrymandering of representative districts, voter 
identification laws, purging of voting rolls, and a 
variety of voter intimidation methods affect 
voting by people of color, especially in the 
southern United States.40 The issue of the 
constitutional permissibility of partisan 
gerrymandering remains uncertain.41
State Borders and Use Taxes: Due Process and 
Commerce Clause Limitations
In 2018 the Supreme Court in Wayfair42 
decided that a state may require a vendor in 
another state and having no physical presence in 
the taxing state to collect use tax from buyers on 
items the vendor ships to them from outside their 
state of residence. The vendor must remit the 
collected tax to the buyer’s state. The decision 
overruled two earlier precedents43 as it addressed 
the authority of one state to reach across state 
lines to compel tax-related action in another state.
Most states impose a tax on the sale and 
delivery of goods in the state. The states collect the 
sales tax by requiring vendors in the state to 
collect the tax at the point of sale and remit the tax 
to the state. In instances in which the buyer is not 
a state resident and the seller ships the goods to 
the buyer at a location outside the state, the state 
generally does not impose its sales tax.44 States 
imposing a sales tax also impose a 
34
Nordlinger, 505 U.S. 1 at 13-14. The Court noted that the new 
purchaser had no right to rely on the historical tax rate on property the 
individual wished to acquire. The economics are also uncertain. The 
market is likely to discount the value of a residence with low property 
taxes when the taxes will increase substantially after sale. The discount 
might be as great as the present value of the increased taxes for several 
years.
35
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
36
U.S. Const. Amendment XIV, section 1.
37
Harper, 383 U.S. 663.
38
U.S. Const. Amend. XXIV, ratified in 1964, prohibits denial of 
franchise in any federal election because a voter fails to pay any tax. The 
amendment did not apply in Harper because the tax was imposed before 
the amendment, but its ratification may have influenced the court’s 
decision.
39
Of course, Black knew that the 24th Amendment would prevent 
future poll taxes.
40
Vann R. Newkirk II, “Voter Suppression Is the New Old Normal,” 
The Atlantic, Oct. 24, 2018.
41
Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, No. 18-281, 580 U.S. ___ 
137 S. Ct. 788 (2019)(dismissing appeal of lower court ruling finding 
gerrymandering unconstitutional).
42
Wayfair, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2080.
43
National Bellas Hess Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 
753 (1967); and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
44
State requirements vary in instances in which the buyer is 
physically present but has the seller ship the goods to an out-of-state 
person who may be the buyer.
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complementary use tax on goods shipped into the 
state for use there.45 Collection of the use tax has 
been problematic. While the consumer of the 
goods has an obligation to pay the tax, many 
consumers do not pay voluntarily, and the state 
lacks the ability to identify all goods shipped to 
consumers in the state. Until Wayfair, states could 
not simplify use tax collection by imposing the 
burden to collect on vendors having no physical 
presence in the state, as earlier Supreme Court 
decisions determined.
When Illinois sought to compel out-of-state 
vendors to collect a use tax on sales of goods 
shipped to Illinois, a Missouri vendor with no 
physical presence but an active mail-order 
business in Illinois challenged the collection 
obligation. The Supreme Court held in National 
Bellas Hess46 that under both the due process 
clause47 and the commerce clause48 of the 
Constitution, the vendor’s lack of physical 
presence in the state precluded imposition of the 
collection obligation on the out-of-state vendor. 
Finding that the requirements of the due process 
and the commerce clauses were closely linked, the 
Court concluded that the tax collection obligation 
imposed a duty without the state having 
jurisdiction over the out-of-state vendor and 
interfered with interstate commerce. Power to 
regulate interstate commerce belongs exclusively 
to Congress.
Later, in Quill,49 the Supreme Court 
abandoned due process as a barrier to imposing 
tax collection responsibility on an out-of-state 
vendor. The Court concluded that it would not be 
fundamentally unfair to an out-of-state vendor to 
carry tax collection responsibility. The Court 
discussed the development of due process 
thinking and decided that the out-of-state 
business availed itself of the markets in the state 
by soliciting business there. However, in the 
absence of physical presence in the state, the 
Court found that the tax collection obligation 
intruded on interstate commerce and, 
accordingly, violated the commerce clause. The 
Court concluded that regulation of interstate 
commerce belonged to Congress and Congress 
had the power to impose the tax collection 
responsibility on out-of-state vendors.
In Wayfair50 the Court determined that it erred 
when it concluded that physical presence in the 
state was essential to the use tax collection 
obligation. Instead, only nexus with the state was 
required and the vendor’s nexus was its use of 
various means to target sales efforts to and 
capture sales into the state by using the internet 
and other means of communication with state 
residents. The vendor was engaged in commerce 
in the state albeit without a physical presence. 
Requiring the vendor to collect and remit state 
taxes on goods it sold and shipped to customers in 
the state did not intrude on interstate commerce 
in violation of the commerce clause. The Court 
acknowledged that the state may regulate the 
impact of interstate commerce if it does not 
discriminate against out-of-state vendors51 and 
has a rational basis for the regulation or tax in this 
case. The necessary rational basis is the loss of tax 
revenue on sales because consumers do not pay 
the use tax on out-of-state purchases they bring 
into or have delivered to them in the state, and 
there is no practical means to collect the use tax in 
most instances. Economic nexus suffices for a 
collection obligation considering the volume of 
commerce conducted over the internet, where 
concepts of physical presence are easily 
manipulated and avoided even in the presence of 
substantial activity over the internet into the 
taxing state.
Wayfair may be a sensible business decision 
for the digital age when physical presence is 
mutable, and frequently means little in terms of 
economic activity. Nevertheless, the decision is 
surprising insofar as the Court in Quill concluded 
that it need not address practical policy 
considerations concerning the digital application 
45
The combination of sales and use taxes produces revenue for the 
state and local governments. Unlike many countries, the United States 
does not have a centrally administered consumption tax like a VAT, 





U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, section 1.
48
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 8, cl. 3: Granting Congress the power “to 




585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2080.
51
E.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) 
(invalidating a gross premiums tax in Alabama that discriminated 
against out-of-state insurers).
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of the commerce clause because Congress had the 
power to resolve the issue and authorize states to 
require out-of-state vendors to collect and remit 
use tax.52 Despite Congress’s failure to act, the 
Court chose to accept control over the matter as it 
applied a practical business standard to the 
limitations of the Constitution. The Court 
overruled its long-standing precedents.53 The 
physical presence test permitted vendors to select 
their locations and structure their businesses to 
avoid the collection responsibility while enabling 
consumers to avoid state use taxes. With so much 
commerce using the internet, the physical 
presence test gave out-of-state vendors a material 
advantage over in-state vendors. Digital presence 
in a state sufficed to satisfy commerce clause 
limitations. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., 
however, joined by three other justices, dissented, 
arguing that the Court should not overrule its 
commerce clause precedents even if incorrect. It is 
Congress’s responsibility to evaluate the 
economic and policy impacts of a change in the 
rule. Failure of Congress to act when it has the 
power to act does not justify the Court’s changing 
the outcome.54
Wayfair raises the question of whether a state 
might reach across an international border to 
compel a vendor to collect use tax on its behalf — 
an important question for sales of products, 
including online sales of purely digital products 
having no physical substance. Does international 
marketing or use of the international banking 
system for payment provide sufficient nexus to 
support imposition of a collection obligation on 
foreign vendors by local taxing authorities? If the 
answer is yes, will internet vendors eschew 
international banking in favor of cryptocurrencies 
to hide from taxing authorities? And how will 
states enforce that collection obligation? In 
domestic contexts, the federal and state courts are 
available to assist in collection because the 
decision is the law of the land. Courts in other 
countries, however, are free to reject the 
jurisdictional conclusions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
The Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act55 
demonstrates how one taxing authority might 
compel action across national borders where it 
otherwise lacks jurisdiction. Under FATCA the 
United States may disqualify foreign financial 
institutions from favored status under U.S. tax 
law. Foreign financial institutions often 
participate in reduced withholding opportunities 
on U.S. investments if they certify that their 
underlying investors meet the reduced 
withholding requirements. As a condition of 
participation in that program, FATCA requires 
the qualifying institutions to assist the United 
States in identifying U.S. taxpayers who invest in 
or through the foreign financial institutions.56 
Noncompliant institutions risk losing preferred 
reporting status regarding unrelated investments. 
Institutions in jurisdictions with financial secrecy 
protections have begun to reject investments from 
U.S. persons so they do not have to choose 
between financial secrecy and loss of preferred 
reporting status for their non-U.S. investors for 
whom the institution invests in the United States. 
It seems less likely that a state might have a 
comparable benefit to offer foreign vendors to 
induce use tax collection.
Borders and Taxing Jurisdiction
Wayfair57 retreats from constitutional 
limitations on state cross-border taxing powers 
and, based on a broad open-ended nexus concept, 
substitutes jurisdiction to regulate sales activities 
of out-of-state vendors when the vendors enter in 
state markets. While permitting states to impose 
the obligation to collect the taxes from the 
vendors’ customers, Wayfair does not empower 
states to impose taxes on the out-of-state vendors 
that have no physical presence in the taxing state. 
The Supreme Court confirmed the continuing 
vitality of the due process clause58 as a limitation 
52
Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
53
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2080, 2097. The South Dakota Supreme Court 
had followed U.S. Supreme Court precedents and ruled against the state.
54
Id. at 2101-2105 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
55
P.L. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71 (2010).
56
IRC section 1471 (requiring U.S. withholding agents to withhold 30 
percent of payments made to foreign financial institutions that are not in 
compliance with FATCA reporting obligations).
57
585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2080.
58
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, section 1.
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on the state’s power to tax out-of-state persons in 
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust.59 In that 
case it held that a trust beneficiary’s residence in a 
state did not provide a sufficient jurisdictional 
basis for taxing an out-of-state trust’s income. The 
beneficiary received no income from the trust and 
had no power to require the trust to distribute 
income to the beneficiary.
Legislating Beyond Precedent
A few years after ratification of the 16th 
Amendment,60 the Supreme Court invalidated a 
statute that included stock dividends in income 
for tax purposes. The Court held that a corporate 
dividend declared and paid in the issuing 
corporation’s own shares was not income under 
the amendment.61 The decision rested on the 
observation that after the dividend the 
shareholder had nothing more than or different 
from what the shareholder had before the 
dividend. The shareholder’s proportional voting 
and participation rights remained unchanged. 
Unlike a cash distribution that increases the 
separate assets of the shareholder and decreases 
the assets of the corporation, a stock dividend 
changes nothing.
While the Court refined the limitations of the 
holding in subsequent cases62 and expanded on 
the language in the decision that suggested 
income must come from capital or labor,63 the 
Court has never overruled the decision. Macomber 
holds that, as a matter of constitutional law, 
separation of something from the capital or 
exchange of the property for cash or other 
property is a condition to inclusion in income.64 
Distribution of cash or property by the 
corporation other than additional shares of the 
same stock is income to the shareholder. A sale or 
other disposition of the corporate shares results in 
gain or loss includable in the income of the 
shareholder. Distribution of additional shares of 
stock is not income.
After Macomber, commentators characterized 
realization as an administrative rule of 
convenience rather than a constitutional 
requirement for inclusion of gain and 
recommended various permutations of taxation 
without realization.65 Congress has enacted 
several statutes that include unrealized gain in 
income under specific circumstances to limit 
opportunities for tax avoidance. No taxpayer or 
interest group has launched a serious 
constitutional challenge to any of the statutes. 
Without a case or controversy, the Court has not 
confronted the constitutional question and the 
statutes remain in force.66
The first of the inclusions without realization 
was the foreign personal holding company rules.67 
Under those statutes, a U.S. person who was a 
shareholder in a closely held foreign corporation 
holding primarily passive investment assets68 was 
taxable as if the corporation distributed its income 
as dividends.69 The statute prevented individuals 
from using foreign corporations to defer inclusion 
in income of the return on their investments with 
an “incorporated (foreign) pocketbook.” The 
59
North Carolina Department of Revenue v. The Kimberly Rice Kaestner 
1992 Family Trust, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).
60
U.S. Const. Amend. XVI.
61
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 US 189 (1920). Shareholders own a greater 
number of shares than before the dividend, but their proportional 
interests are unchanged. The market value of a shareholder’s total 
shareholdings may increase because of the stock dividend because the 
market may perceive the stock dividend as indicating that the 
corporation is doing well so that the share price rises. Alternatively, the 
market availability of a greater number of shares outstanding at a 
reduced dilution adjusted price per share increases demand for the 
shares at a lower price.
62
E.g., Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936) (common share 
dividend with respect to preferred shares was taxable).
63
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (punitive 
damages are income).
64
The exchange of property for cash or other property is referred to 
as realization, IRC section 1001(a). Gain or loss realized from the sale or 
exchange of property is recognized; that is, included in the taxpayer’s 
income under IRC section 1001(c), unless another provision in the code 
permits the taxpayer to defer or exclude the recognized gain or loss. 
Many exceptions exist including IRC section 351, which permits transfer 
of property to a corporation in exchange for corporate shares.
65
Stanley S. Surrey, “The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: 
Some Implications of the Recent Decisions,” 35 Ill. L. Rev. 779, 782-85 
(1941) (administrative convenience). The literature favoring a shift away 
from realization-based taxation is extensive: David J. Shakow, “Taxation 
Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation,” 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1111 (1986); Jeff Strnad, “Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and 
Implementation,” 99 Yale L.J. 1817 (1990); and Deborah H. Schenk, “An 
Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based Tax,” 57 Tax L. 
Rev. 503 (2004).
66
See discussion of the case or controversy requirement, supra note 23 
and accompanying text.
67
IRC section 551 et seq. enacted 1937, repealed 2004.
68
IRC section 553 (repealed).
69
IRC section 551(b) (repealed).
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personal holding company provisions that 
imposed a penalty tax on a U.S. incorporated 
pocketbook70 did not violate Macomber because 
they taxed the corporation and did not impute a 
nonexistent dividend. A penalty tax could not 
apply to a foreign corporation because the United 
States did not have the power to tax a foreign 
corporation without a U.S. presence, but it did 
have the power to tax the corporation’s U.S. 
owners. A single reported decision rejected a 
challenge to the foreign personal holding 
company tax on the shareholders but on grounds 
other than the imputed dividend, and relating to 
the shareholder’s inability to use blocked 
currency in the United States.71 When Congress 
later enacted another antiabuse structure for U.S. 
owners of a foreign corporation, Congress 
avoided imputing a nonexistent dividend and 
taxed the foreign corporation’s income directly to 
the U.S. shareholders.72 Disregarding the 
existence of the foreign corporation regarding 
income abusively directed to the foreign 
corporation was a more acceptable mechanism 
because it redirected income to its actual owner.73
Not until 1984 did Congress enact a statute 
requiring taxpayers to include in their incomes 
the appreciation or depreciation in the value of 
their property without realization.74 The statute 
requires taxpayers to mark to market 
commodities and financial investment positions 
annually and include any change in the value 
during the year in income without an event of 
realization like a sale of the position. Industry 
participants offered no resistance to annual 
inclusion because they probably benefited from 
the statute.75 Many industry participants did not 
hold the applicable positions for long periods. The 
statute defined includable gain from marking to 
market as 60 percent favored long-term capital 
gain usually requiring a one-year holding period 
and 40 percent short-term capital gain without 
regard to the taxpayer’s actual holding period. 
There was no constitutional challenge to the 
statute.76 The more recently enacted expatriation 
tax77 uses the mark-to-market inclusion 
mechanism. The expatriation tax requires 
individuals who relinquish their U.S. citizenship 
or — if noncitizen residents, their right to reside in 
the United States — to mark all their property to 
market and include gain or loss in income when 
they expatriate. The tax is an antiabuse provision 
and has not been challenged constitutionally.78
The recently enacted transition tax79 is not an 
antiabuse provision but facilitates the change to 
limited territoriality in U.S. taxation.80 The tax is 
imposed one time and has stretched the limits of 
extranational taxation. It taxes earnings 
accumulated by a foreign corporation over 
several years to its U.S. shareholders81 without the 
foreign corporation making any distributions or 
the U.S. shareholders taking any action regarding 
the accumulated foreign income. Like the 
shareholders receiving the stock dividend in 
Macomber,82 the shareholders are taxed even 
though they have nothing different from what 
they had before the tax imposition and do not 
even receive a stock dividend. After the one-time 
tax, distributions out of foreign earnings of 
foreign corporations to their U.S. shareholders 
that are corporations are free from U.S. tax.83 A 
constitutional challenge to the tax seems unlikely 
because the tax is imposed at a significantly 
reduced rate, can be spread over several years, 
and enables major corporations with foreign 
70
IRC section 541 et seq.
71
Eder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 138 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1943).
72
IRC section 951 (taxing U.S. shareholders on some income of 
controlled foreign corporations) (enacted 1962).
73
Compare IRC section 482 (power to reallocate income and 
deductions between taxpayers to clearly reflect income) and such cases 
as Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (income from services taxable to the 
individual who provided the services and earned the income).
74
IRC section 1256 (enacted 1984).
75
Ordower, “Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, the 
Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to Market,” 13 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (1993).
76
IRC section 475 (requiring dealers in securities to mark their 
positions to market also drew no challenge because it included 
simplified opportunities to identify securities held for investment and 
exempt from marking to market).
77
IRC section 877A (enacted 2010).
78
Ordower, “The Expatriation Tax, Deferrals, Mark to Market, the 
Macomber Conundrumand Doubtful Constitutionality,” 15 Pitt. Tax Rev. 1 
(2017).
79
IRC section 965 as added by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97).
80
The United States taxes its citizens, residents, and domestic 
corporations on their worldwide income. IRC section 61; and reg. section 
1.1-1(b).
81
A U.S. shareholder is a term of art meaning a U.S. person owning 
10 percent or more of the voting power or value of a foreign (non-U.S.) 
corporation.
82
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189.
83
IRC section 245A (100 percent dividends received deduction).
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subsidiaries to repatriate foreign earnings at a low 
U.S. tax cost without restrictions on how the U.S. 
corporate shareholders use those repatriated 
earnings.84
Discussions in the media, among scholars, 
and in Congress regarding additional tax law 
changes recommend taking the United States still 
further from the realization limitations of 
Macomber and apportionment clause limitation.85 
For example, several members of Congress have 
proposed a wealth tax — seemingly at odds with 
the apportionment clause86 and not a tax on 
income — applicable annually on the value of the 
individual’s property. Proposals would exclude 
individuals with property valued at less than an 
asset threshold so that the tax would shift more of 
the overall tax burden to wealthy residents and 
U.S. citizens.87 If enacted (and chances of 
enactment are low), the tax would be a direct tax 
on capital.
The Supreme Court held such a direct tax 
unconstitutional long ago,88 but in this new era 
when constitutional limitations no longer seem a 
barrier, a wealth tax might not be challenged. 
Other proposals would expand annual marking 
to market to all securities and possibly other 
property.89 Those proposals are consistent with 
unchallenged statutes already applicable to 
commodities90 and at expatriation91 even if their 
enactment seems contrary to Macomber.
Ignoring the Constitution
The preceding parts of this section suggest 
that the U.S. Constitution and possibly state 
constitutions play only a small role in 
constraining legislative action under the 
legislature’s taxing authority. Constitutions 
primarily loom in the background, informing 
legislative reflection and possibly encouraging 
legislative restraint, but rarely becoming an 
impediment when the legislature chooses a 
course of action. Supreme Court decisions on tax 
matters provide some guidance to legislatures but 
it tends to be vague.
Discrimination in Taxation
While the Supreme Court has determined that 
a state may not tax an out-of-state business more 
than a comparable in-state business,92 or a federal 
retiree less favorably than a state retiree,93 the 
Court defers to the legislatures regarding the 
distributional characteristics of the tax structures 
if there is some rational basis for the tax.94 The 
Court has not determined that the Constitution 
requires a taxing system to embed the equality-
based principles of horizontal or vertical equity.95 
Seemingly like taxpayers need not be taxed alike 
if any rational governmental purpose for 
distinguishing them exists96 and progressive 
taxation based on ability-to-pay principles may be 
appealing to scholars but is not constitutionally 
required.97 Even the new 20 percent deduction for 
qualified business income is unlikely to be 
challenged successfully despite its classifications 
84
Ordower, “Abandoning Realization and the Transition Tax: Toward 
a Comprehensive Tax Base,” 67 Buffalo L. Rev. 1371 (2019). And see Hank 
Adler and Lacy Willis, “The Worst Statutory Precedent in Over 100 
Years,” Tax Notes, Sept. 3, 2018, p. 1413; and Mark E. Berg and Fred 
Feingold, “The Deemed Repatriation Tax — A Bridge Too Far?” Tax 
Notes, Mar. 5, 2018, p. 1345, for arguments that the transition tax is 
unconstitutional because it is not apportioned as required by U.S. Const. 
Art. I, section 9, cl. 4. A constitutional challenge to the transition tax is 
pending in a district court but seems unlikely to succeed. Moore v. United 
States, No. 2:19-cv-01539 (W.D. Wash. 2020).
85




Neil Irwin, “Elizabeth Warren Wants a Wealth Tax. How Would 
That Even Work?” The New York Times, Feb. 18, 2019.
88
Pollock, 157 U.S. 429.
89
David Leonhardt, “A Man With a Plan for Inequality: Let the Rich 
Be Taxed the Way Everyone Else Is,” The New York Times, Apr. 3, 2019. See 






Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 
(1997) (property tax exemption discriminating against out-of-state 
residents is impermissible).
93
Dawson, 586 U.S. ___ (2019), text accompanying note 12.
94
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) (rejecting 
equal protection and due process challenges to a progressive income 
tax). In Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940), the Court stated: “The 
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most 
explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive 
discrimination against particular persons and classes.”
95
Compare the decision of the German Constitutional Court 
requiring horizontal equity in taxation but requiring only that “taxation 
of higher incomes be measured against taxation of lower incomes 
(vertical equity).” BVerfGE 107, 27, 46 (Dec. 4, 2002), translation and 
discussion from Ordower, “Horizontal and Vertical Equity,” supra note 
26, at 304.
96
Nordlinger, 505 U.S. 1, and text accompanying note 29.
97
Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven Jr., “The Uneasy Case for 
Progressive Taxation,” 19 The U. Chi. L. Rev. 417 (1952).
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of taxpayers, favoring self-employed individuals 
over employees and disfavoring services 
performed in some professions.98
Scholars observe that the federal income tax 
discriminates racially in its delivery of the tax 
benefits associated with home ownership.99 The 
bias in delivery of the tax benefits is not explicit in 
the statute. The statute allowing a deduction for 
mortgage interest, for example, is neutral and 
applies to all taxpayers.100 It permits a deduction 
for residence interest when other personal interest 
is not deductible.101 In addition to the mortgage 
interest deduction, the U.S. income tax does not 
include the use value of homes in the income of 
the homeowner and applies a favorable rate of 
taxation to gain on the sale of property. Both offer 
significant tax advantages to homeowners 
relative to renters.102 Renters are taxable on the 
income they use to pay rent103 but owners are not 
taxed on their use of their owned property. In 
effect owners pay for use of a residence with 
pretax dollars and renters with after-tax dollars. 
Yet, participation of people of color in the owned 
rather than rental housing market tends to be low 
nationally relative to white taxpayers.104 Absent an 
express racial classification in allowance of tax 
benefits, the Constitution does not prevent the 
discriminatory impact of the tax law.
Church and State Separation
From its beginning as an independent nation, 
the United States required separation of church 
and state.105 A governmental grant to a religious 
organization to enable it to build or improve a 
facility for a religious purpose may be 
impermissible and inconsistent with the 
establishment clause,106 yet recently the Supreme 
Court held that a governmental agency may 
provide monetary assistance to a religious 
organization to improve a children’s playground 
adjacent to a religious facility.107 That decision may 
open the door to direct governmental payments to 
support religious functions or it may be an 
aberration because the playground improvement 
subsidy was designed for children’s safety 
regardless of religious affiliation or promotion.
From the tax perspective, a legislative decision 
to provide a tax benefit to religious organizations 
is acceptable as long as the enabling statute does 
not discriminate by religious sect.108 Accordingly, 
a tax exemption for a religious organization is 
permissible.109 In fact, taxing religious institutions 
may be problematic. The state would have the 
power to destroy the institution if the state were to 
impose excessive and destructive taxation.110 The 
exclusion from gross income of a housing 
allowance paid to “ministers of the gospel”111 
98
IRC section 199A, added by the TCJA, allows a deduction for 
qualified business income but excludes services performed as an 
employee and income from specified service businesses under section 
199A(d). For commentary, see Edward Kleinbard, “Congress’ Worst Tax 
Idea Ever,” The Hill, Mar. 25, 2019.
99
E.g., Dorothy A. Brown, “Shades of the American Dream,” 87 Wash. 
U. L. Rev. 329 (2010) (arguing implicit bias in delivery of tax benefits).
100
IRC section 163(h)(2)(D) (deduction for qualified residence 
interest). The deduction is an itemized deduction that is less likely to 
offer a tax benefit after the TCJA because fewer taxpayers will itemize 
their deductions under the now larger standard deduction of IRC section 
63.
101
IRC section 163(h) (personal interest disallowed).
102
Ordower, “Income Imputation: Toward Equal Treatment of 
Renters and Owners,” in Controversies in Tax Law: A Matter of Perspective 
(2015).
103
IRC section 262 (residential rent is a personal and family expense 
and not deductible).
104
Jung Hyun Choi and Laurie Goodman, “What Explains the 
Homeownership Gap Between Black and White Young Adults?” Urban 
Institute (Nov. 20, 2018).
105
U.S. Const. Amend. I reads in part: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”
106
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (stating that the state 
or federal government may not subsidize a religious facility but holding 
that the government may provide children transportation at government 
expense to religious schools as it provides transportation to public 
schools).
107
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. ___, 137 
S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
108
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (denying a 
deduction for Scientology auditing payments because the donor of the 
payments receives identifiable services in exchange, and adding that the 
charitable contribution deduction for contributions to religious 
organizations is long-standing and not an establishment clause 
violation).
109
Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
Compare, McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, and accompanying text at 
note 10.
110
C.f. McCulloch 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, and accompanying text at 
note 10.
111
IRC section 107 (exclusion of lodging and an allowance for lodging 
used for that purpose). Ministers of the gospel is neutral and includes 
individuals serving ministerial functions in all religions.
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withstood a challenge in the Seventh Circuit.112 
Other taxpayers who are not ministers paid by a 
religious organization may not exclude housing 
allowances and may exclude only lodging 
provided in kind for the employer’s convenience 
and on their employer’s premises.113
The Supreme Court has stated that the 
indirect subsidization of religious organizations 
through the charitable contribution deduction 
does not violate the establishment clause as long 
as the subsidy is equally available to all religions 
institutions.114 Exempting a religious organization 
from tax, providing school transportation, and 
protecting children from injury on playgrounds 
are different from the government subsidizing 
donations to religious organizations. The 
charitable contribution deduction statute permits 
donors to direct part of the amount they 
otherwise would be obligated to pay in tax to the 
religious organization when they deduct the 
contributions they make to religious 
organizations.115 The neutrality of the statute 
rather than its delivery of a subsidy is the focus of 
the Supreme Court’s dictum. The effect of a 
charitable contribution deduction is a subsidy 
from the government to the religious institution 
equal to the tax benefit the donor derives from the 
contribution.116
Congress included the subsidy of the 
deduction in the tax law despite the constitutional 
limitation of the establishment clause. The 
Supreme Court extended permissibility of 
subsidies to religious education by ruling in 
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue117 that a 
state providing a tax credit benefit for private 
education must also include religious schools 
despite the Montana Supreme Court’s ruling to 
the contrary. Commentators view the decision as 
far-reaching approval of government subsidies to 
religious schools that may threaten funding for 
public education by diverting governmental 
funds to private religious schools.118
State Constitutional Limitations on Taxes and Tax 
Increases
Several states have amended their 
constitutions to include tax limitations.119 The 
limitations require an affirmative vote by the 
citizens before the governmental unit may 
increase a tax or enact a new tax. Both the state 
and its underlying municipal governments and 
agencies120 have found it to be difficult to persuade 
voters to approve increases to provide the state or 
local government with the needed revenue to 
fund specified governmental services. In 
Missouri, the limitation includes governmental 
agency fees and taxes.121 The constitutional 
provision prohibits tax increases without the vote 
but does not require a rebate of taxes collected in 
violation of the constitution122 unless the state 
government collects excess revenues. The state 
must rebate excess state revenue through an 
income tax refund.123
Circumventing the constitutional limitation 
on taxes, municipal governments use their police 
power to produce revenue. The municipal 
executive provides the chief of police a revenue 
target and the chief of police instructs police 
officers to increase traffic and other offense 
112
Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2019). The court found a 
sufficient secular purpose in the exclusion despite its effect to support 
religion. The court identified three secular purposes for the legislation: 
“to eliminate discrimination against ministers, to eliminate 
discrimination between ministers, and to avoid excessive entanglement 
with religion.” For the first purpose, only some ministers would fit the 
general exclusion under IRC section 119. Similarly, within the class of 
ministers, those receiving housing would exclude its value under section 




Hernandez, 490 U.S. 680 (the statement is dictum and not a holding 
of the Court because there was no challenge to the deductibility of 
charitable contributions to churches).
115
IRC section 170 (c) (allowing a deduction for contributions to some 
organizations, including religious organizations).
116
E.g., if a taxpayer whose income is subject to 20 percent tax makes 
a charitable contribution, the 20 percent tax on an equivalent amount of 
the taxpayer’s income is redirected by the taxpayer to the donee. Of a 
$100 contribution the taxpayer provides $80 and the government $20. 
Details of the operation of the charitable contribution deduction are 
complicated by computational limitations in the IRC that are beyond the 
scope of this chapter.
117
591 U.S. ___ (2020).
118
Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court Gives Religious Schools More 
Access to State Aid,” The New York Times, June 30, 2020.
119
See discussion, supra note 11 and accompanying and following 
text.
120
Municipal governments and agencies are not wholly independent 
governmental agencies but derive their power from the state even if the 
state constitution or legislation grants them the power to act 
independently.
121
Mo. Const. Art. X, section 18 (state); section 22 (local governments 
and agencies).
122
Mo. Const. Art. X, section 23. Zweig v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer 
District, 412 S.W.3d 223, 251-252 (Mo. 2013).
123
Mo. Const. Art. X, section 18(b).
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citations to meet those revenue targets. Level of 
enforcement is flexible124 so increasing 
enforcement is within police discretion. The 
municipal court imposes fines based on the 
citations and fees for use of the court and 
collateral functions of the court. The relationship 
between the offenses and punishment for the 
offenses loses significance relative to the revenue-
producing function.125
The revenue produced by the fines and court 
fees are taxes, not punishments for traffic and 
other offenses,126 because their primary function 
becomes revenue production rather than 
promotion of public safety or punishment of law 
violators.127 As taxes they violate the state 
constitution because they were enacted under the 
police power rather than the taxing power of the 
state and voters did not approve them. Although 
there has been significant movement in scaling 
back the excessive use of fines in Missouri, no 
litigation has commenced to challenge the fines 
under the constitution’s tax limitations.
Conclusion
The Constitution includes many protections 
for individual liberties and guarantees due 
process of law, equal protection, and separation of 
church and state. Where taxes are involved, the 
Constitution is rarely a barrier to legislative 
decision-making. The Supreme Court as arbiter of 
constitutional questions defers to legislative 
decisions regarding taxes if they have a rational 
state purpose and do not discriminate against out-
of-state taxpayers. Regarding federal tax 
legislation, the Court similarly defers to Congress 
and has spoken to constitutional matters only on 
limited occasions. Even when the Court has 
spoken, the effect of its decision has retreated to 
insignificance except as background, informing 
but not controlling debate as to permissible 
changes in the tax laws. 
124
E.g., an officer may issue a citation for any infraction of a speed 
limit but usually there is some tolerance for small infractions. The 
amount of tolerance is flexible.
125
Henry Ordower, J.S. Onésimo Sandoval, and Kenneth Warren, 
“Out of Ferguson: Misdemeanors, Municipal Courts, Tax Distribution, 




C.f. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 
519 (2012) for an expansive definition of tax to include the shared 
responsibility payment under the Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148).
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